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The Italian jobs crisis consists of a high percentage of non-
working labour force, matched with a high percentage of 
discouraged, long-term unemployed and inactive 
population. Not only a sharp deregulation of the job 
market is groundless, but even a hypothetic return to 
expansionary fiscal policy would be insufficient in order 
to solve such structural problems. Starting from the 
literature dealing with the “Italian decline”, this article 
demonstrates that the current problems of the Italian 
labour market are strictly connected to both (post-crisis) 





⋄  Università degli Studi di Macerata,  
    email: stefano.perri@unimc.it 
* Universidad Nacional de San Martin, Buenos Aires  
(Argentina), email: robertolampa@gmail.com 
How to cite this article: 
Perri S., Lampa R. (2018), “When small sized and non-
innovating firms meet a crisis: Evidence from the 
Italian labour market”, PSL Quarterly Review, 71(284): 
61-83. 
DOI: 10.13133/2037-3643_71.284_4 
JEL codes:  
J2, E2, B5 
Keywords:  
euro crisis, job market, industrial structure, Minsky  






Empirical evidence (ISTAT, 2016) has recently revealed the ineffectiveness of the radical 
reform of the job market (law 183/2014 and addenda, commonly known as the Jobs Act) 
recently implemented by the past Italian government.1 A robust explanation of such a failure 
                                                             
* The authors wish to thank Gugliemo Forges Davanzati, Anna Grazia Quaranta, the editor, Carlo D’Ippoliti, and the 
referees for their valuable and helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Analysing data for 2015, Bendinelli (2017) concludes that the increased incidence of permanent contracts was 
largely attributable to monetary incentives, rather than the regulatory changes introduced by the Jobs Act. In 
addition, Cirillo, Fana and Guarascio (2017) emphasize that such increase in open-ended positions is concentrated 
in low-skilled branches. Furthermore, they stress that (i) new open-ended contracts are mostly driven by 
transformation of pre-existing contracts; (ii) a relevant share of new open-ended positions is represented by part-
time contracts and (iii) the increase in employment is concentrated among older employees. More recent data 
confirm that, from 2014 to 2016, employees rose by 3.2% overall, however fixed-term workers grew by 6.5%, 
whereas permanent workers only 2.6% (www.istat.it/it/lavoro-e-retribuzioni). Looking at the data for the third 
quarter of 2017 (ISTAT, 2017b), when compared to 2014, the number of employees grew by 5.8%, nevertheless 
fixed-term workers increased by 22.3%, while the permanent workers by 3.2%. Furthermore, in the third quarter 
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necessarily implies a reconsideration of the causes of the Italian crisis, particularly in the 
market of labour. 
Back in 2014 – the year in which the Jobs Act was discussed and enacted – two publications 
issued by two bodies of the Italian administration seem particularly useful to this end. Firstly, 
ISTAT’s Annual Report (ISTAT, 2014) highlighted that the recession had shifted GDP back to 
the level of year 2000. In particular, the statistical office emphasized two anomalous features 
of the Italian economy, when compared to the rest of the EU countries: they concern the labour 
market and fiscal policy. On the one hand, unemployment reached a peak of 12.2% in 2013: 
one of its highest level since the 1950s. On the other hand, not only did the Italian government 
not implement any expansionary fiscal policy between 2008 and 2012, but it even enacted a 
fiscal adjustment equivalent to 5% of GDP in the same period. More precisely, tax revenues 
increased by 122 billion Euro whereas public expenditures decreased by 53 billion Euro 
(ISTAT, 2014). 
Secondly, the Report on the Labour Market 2013-2014 (CNEL, 2014) explicitly questioned 
the meaningfulness of the official rate of unemployment, considering some unprecedented 
characteristics of the Italian job market. Assuming a definition of unemployment very close to 
the U-62 adopted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the publication emphasized that the 
rate of discouraged workers was extremely high in Italy when compared to the rest of the 
European Union (14.2% vs. 4.1%). Furthermore, CNEL evidenced that the reduction of working 
hours to zero (“Cassa integrazione a zero ore”) involved 527.986 people in 2014 (CGIL, 2014). 
Accordingly, the real percentage of non-working labour force was equivalent to approximately 
28%. 
To complete the picture, one may add that the rate of economically active population was 
sensibly lower in 2016 than the EU average (69.6% vs. 77.5%3) and, also, that the rate of long-
term unemployment in Italy was higher (57.4% vs. 46.4%4). Furthermore, the 2017 Welfare 
State Report by Felice Roberto Pizzuti (2017) highlighted that the Italian job market has been 
characterized by a serious mismatch between demand and supply of labour. Notwithstanding 
an extremely low percentage of highly educated labourers (only 25% of the 30-34 years old 
active population has got a degree, versus the 38.7% of the European Union), the Italian labour 
force is over-educated when compared to the skills demanded by the employers. Since most 
Italian firms are both small-sized and belonging to mature branches, firms prefer cost-reducing 
decisions over investments in human capital. Accordingly, the demand for labour is insufficient 
in order to employ the domestic supply of highly skilled labour force, although this latter 
remain modest when compared to the rest of the advanced economies.5 
In other words, already in 2014 the Italian case revealed a worrisome scenario: a high 
percentage of non-working labour force was matched by a high percentage of discouraged, 
long-term unemployed and inactive (i.e. obsolete, from the employers’ point of view) 
                                                             
of 2017 the share of fixed workers on total reached 15.7% that is the highest value since 1993. Since in 2014 such 
share was 13.6%, it is easy to conclude that the Jobs Act has not succeeded in stimulating the growth of permanent 
employment with respect to fixed-term employees. 
2 “Total unemployed, plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force, plus total employed part time for 
economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force” 
(see https://labor.ny.gov/stats/PDFs/alternative_measures.pdf). 
3 Eurostat, Employment and activity by sex and age – annual data, available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/eurostat/data/database  
4 Eurostat, Long-term unemployment by sex – annual average, available at http://ec.europa.eu 
/eurostat/data/database  
5 See e.g. OECD, World Indicators of Skills for Employment, available at http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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population. Therefore, not only was a sharp deregulation of the job market groundless, but 
even a hypothetic change in the fiscal policy (the much-debated ‘end of austerity’) would have 
been insufficient to solve such structural problems. As evidenced by the works of Hyman 
Minsky ([1965] 2013; 1986; 2014), in similar cases the government has to act resolutely, as an 
‘employer of the last resort’. 
Starting from such a theoretical background, this article aims to show that the current 
problems of the Italian job market are strictly connected to both the austerity measures and 
the pre-existing features of the industrial branch. The thesis we want to explore is that the 
consequences of the crisis on employment have been more severe in Italy than in other EU 
countries also because of the (previous) unbalanced distribution of industrial jobs within the 
micro-enterprises. That is the case in both non-innovating and non-exporting firms, as such 
more exposed to the consequences of fluctuations and/or crises. From this perspective, our 
article builds on several contributions (De Cecco, 2007; D’Ippoliti and Roncaglia, 2011; Ciocca, 
2012; Ferrari, 2012; Lucarelli et al., 2013; Perri and Lampa, 2014; Forges Davanzati, 2016), 
which stress that, in Italy, the pre-existence of a non-innovating industrial branch has been 
weakening the expansionary effect of aggregate demand on GDP for decades.  
 
 
1. The convergent analysis of the Italian job market: A critique and a restatement 
 
The economic literature on the jobs crisis in Italy consists of two converging fields of 
research, both belonging to the state failure paradigm. In the first place, a group of mainstream 
scholars (Ichino et al., 2005; Alesina and Giavazzi, 2008; Alesina and Ichino, 2009) has been 
emphasizing that Italy’s labour productivity remained lower than that of other EU countries 
because of the excessive protection of employment and, accordingly, the strong incentive to 
moral hazard by salaried employees. Therefore, they have repeatedly proposed radical 
reforms of the job market, aimed at increasing labour market flexibility, meant as the only 
viable strategy in order to achieve both economic growth and a higher rate of employment. 
After 2008, a very important addendum has been issued: those countries (Ireland, Latvia) that 
had already implemented similar reforms in the job market before the crisis showed a better 
recovery than the ones (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy) that changed their legislation only 
after the financial breakdown (Draghi, 2014). 
Based on such premises, the public debate on the possible solutions to the crisis in Italy 
has been hegemonized by several proposals of reform of the labour market, which eventually 
led to the aforementioned Jobs Act in 2014. From this perspective, the economists belonging to 
this branch insisted on a more flexible job market in Italy in order to stimulate recovery from 
the crisis, showing an explicit continuity with a pioneering work by Olivier Blanchard (2006). 
This notwithstanding, they deliberately ignored the subsequent updates of this very same field 
of research, such as the partial retraction by Blanchard himself (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).6 
In the second place, another group of more heterodox authors (e.g. Travaglini, 2013; 
Saltari e Travaglini, 2009; Lucidi and Kleinknecht, 2010) stated that the Italian jobs crisis was 
the effect of a government failure. Contrarily to the aforementioned literature, these 
contributions stressed that the excess of reforms implemented in the labour market during the 
years before the crisis (1997 and 2003) produced an unprecedented change in the legislation 
that acted as an exogenous shock on the supply side. More precisely, in the 1997-2007 period, 
                                                             
6 See in particular paragraph IV.B (“Components of Aggregate Spending and Unemployment”), pp. 17-18. 
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the huge increase in labour market flexibility represented an incentive for firms to re-switch 
to labour intensive techniques, which implied a decrease in labour productivity, in investments 
in innovation and, therefore, in the competitiveness of the whole industrial branch. 
Accordingly, the 2008 crisis affected the Italian economy in a more severe way because of such 
a (pre-existing) deteriorated economic outlook. 
Notwithstanding the different implications, it is worth noting that also in this case the 
most important theoretical antecedent was represented by an article by Olivier Blanchard 
(1997), in which he stressed the disturbing role played on the European labour markets by a 
technological (exogenous) shock that took place in the 1980s.  
In other words, the Italian debate revealed an unexpected convergence between the main 
fields of research. In both cases, the jobs crisis is the effect of the declining productivity of 
labour, which in turn is the effect of institutional inefficiencies that characterized Italy in the 
years before 2008. Accordingly, a number of unspecified “reforms” would represent the only 
viable (although painful) solution to Italy’s problems. On the other hand, both types of analysis 
minimize the role played by fiscal conservatism, implicitly ignoring that the compression of the 
aggregate demand, the increasing inequality and the contractionary fiscal policies7 have also 
determined a decrease in labour productivity (Delli Gatti et al., 2012a; 2012b; Blanchard and 
Leigh, 2013). The intensity of such tendencies in Italy, in the three decades before the global 
crisis, was such that the whole industrial branch had already been affected. 
In line with these latter works, our thesis is that a long-lasting solution to the problems of 
the Italian job market necessarily implies a resolute fiscal stimulus on aggregate demand, since 
public expenditures remain a fundamental tool in order to create job opportunities, both in the 
public and in the private sector, especially during a severe crisis. However, we are also 
persuaded that such a stimulus would be insufficient if not matched by an industrial policy 
aimed at directing investments towards a limited number of strategic – as well as innovating – 
branches (D’Ippoliti and Roncaglia, 2011; Ciocca, 2003; 2012; Ferrari, 2012; Lucarelli et al., 
2013). To our eyes, the most important result of such a policy would be to incentivize the 
centralization of industrial capitals, thus contrasting the permanence of workers in inefficient 
micro-enterprises, since these latter are more exposed to the negative consequences of 
fluctuations and/or crises (ILO, 2009; OECD, 2009). Stated succinctly, our thesis is that full (and 
good) employment is a task of the government. 
A similar idea of a government as employer of the last resort is originally advanced by 
Minsky ([1965] 2013; 1986; 2014), Sylos Labini (1984a; 1987; 1999) and, more recently, by 
Harvey (1989) and Leon (2014; 2016). In Minsky’s pioneering formulation, raising aggregate 
demand using fiscal policy, although necessary, is not sufficient in order to end poverty and 
long-term unemployment because of two reasons. First, government spending is biased both 
toward ‘non-expanding jobs sectors’ such as military expenditures, monopolies etc. Second, 
public expenditures are unbalanced in favour of the richest part of the population (via tax cuts). 
Such combination of biases implies that ‘Keynesianism’ alone would not reduce inequality 
significantly:  
Obviously, labor is not homogenous and fluid. The gestation period of a worker with particular 
skills in a particular place may be quite time consuming and the gestation process quite costly. At 
every day there is a need not only to generate the right kinds of labor, but also to make do with the 
available labor force […]. Since labor is actually heterogeneous and viscous, the efficacy of different 
                                                             
7 It seems important to highlight that Italy have run continuously a primary surplus since 1992. 
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demand-generating instruments in rising employment depends upon where the initial change in 
final demand takes place, what the immediate derived demands are, and what the ultimate change 
in final demand is […]. A conventional argument is that fiscal ease can be used to offset the effects 
of tight money; and seemingly, tax reductions are perfect substitutes for spending programs. But 
this, in fact, is not so. (Minsky, [1965] 2013, pp. 13-14). 
Accordingly, in Minsky’s eyes, a durable solution to long-term unemployment consists of 
a resolute state interventionism inspired by both F.D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and L.B. Johnson’s 
War on Poverty: the focus of any anti-poverty policy should be re-oriented towards direct jobs 
creation, rather than welfare state and transfer payments. Minsky also shows that job-creating 
policies produce a multiplier effect on the labour demand of the private sector. Additionally, 
they prevent the wage dumping determined by the expansion of the industrial reserve army. 
In line with the aforementioned works, the thesis we are going to explore is that the Italian 
jobs crisis depends in the first place on fiscal conservatism (particularly after the crisis) and, 
in the second place, on the lack of a proper industrial policy in the past three decades. 
 
 
2. Pro-ciclical and contractionary effects of fiscal conservatism on the job market 
 
A mere observation of stylized facts (fig. 1) suggests that, in Italy, employment is highly 
correlated to the variations of domestic demand (our analysis is grounded on descriptive 
statistics).8 
Such correlation is even reinforced once we compare the dynamics of domestic demand 
with the average of the EMU (European Monetary Union), Germany and France. Assuming that 
the 1991 level of real domestic demand is equal to 100, in 2015 the average of the EMU 
countries reached 136.6, Germany 127.1, and France 145.3. In contrast, Italy showed a very 
modest result: 109.7.  
What is striking about the Italian (poor) performance is that it mostly depends on the 
policies implemented after the global crisis. In fact, in 2008, Italy still showed a higher level of 
domestic demand than Germany (121.4 vs. 118.7), despite it being sensibly lower than both 
the EMU average (139.6) and France (139.1). In other words, during the crisis, Italy and 
Germany were characterized by two opposite fiscal policies. In spite of the dominant narrative, 
only the Italian governments implemented a dramatic fiscal adjustment (as discussed above) 
whereas Germany’s administrations actually expanded domestic demand.  
Looking at the dynamics of investment in Italy, we find an even higher correlation with the 










                                                             
8 In what follows, we focus on domestic demand, because it is particularly affected by the austerity policies. 
Furthermore, it shows a greater impact on the level of employment.  
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Note: the series are standardized by calculating the difference between each observation and the sample mean, and 
dividing by the standard deviation.  
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This is not surprising, since investment is the most important component of domestic 
demand concerning the level of employment. Nevertheless, the comparison with EMU 
countries, Germany and France clearly evidences a worrisome situation. Comparing the 2000-
2007 period to the 2008-2015 period in real terms, the total value of gross capital formation 
in Italy has decreased by –13.4%. In the EMU countries, it has remained almost the same (–
0.3%) while it has increased significantly both in France (+6.9%) and in Germany (+8.2%).  
The remarkable performance of Germany can be easily explained by the investment in the 
public sector (table 1): in the examined period, it increased by +17%. A similar tendency 
involved France (+5%) and the euro area. On the contrary, the catastrophic performance of 




Table 1 – Gross capital formation: General government, billion euros 
 
  2000-2007 2008-2015 Var. % 
EU15 2771.8 2976.3 7.38 
EA12 2231.7 2310.4 3.53 
Germany 397.8 465.5 17.02 
France 605.4 635.8 5.03 
Italy 376.8 343.6 –8.8 
 




The pro-cyclical dynamics of public investment in Italy has always had serious 
consequences on the job market. Figure 3 shows the correlation between public investment 
and employment. Plotting together the standardized9 values of the two variables (fig. 4), it is 
possible to show how the negative values of percentage variations in employment of both the 
early 1990s and the 2008-2016 periods are associated with a negative variation in public 
investment. In the 26-year period examined, the signs of the variation of the two quantities 
have been different only four times.10 
Therefore, an expansion of investment (both public and private) seems inescapable in 
order to counteract unemployment.11 Regardless of this, the current debate is circumscribed 
to the ‘indirect’ stimuli on investment alone,12 in spite of the poor results evidenced by similar 
policies when compared to the direct investment by the government (Mazzucato, 2014).13 
                                                             
9 The values of the general government gross fixed capital formation in the AMECO database are in nominal terms.  
10 It will be noted, confronting figure 2 and figure 3, that while in the year 2003 and in the year 2009 public 
investments rose, total investments decreased sharply. At this regard, one should keep in mind that variations of 
employment are affected by total investments and not only by public investments alone. 
11 Notwithstanding the (overall) optimistic conclusions of their work, also Fortis and Quadrio Curzio (2018) 
emphasize the disturbing role played by decreasing public investment on both growth and jobs creation in Italy 
(2014-2017). 
12 See for instance the so-called Juncker Plan, November 2014. 
13 “The assumptions that all the State has to do is to ‘nudge’ the private sector in the right direction; that tax credits 
will work because business is eager to invest in innovations; that removing obstacles and regulations is necessary; 
that small firms – simply due to their size – are more flexible and that their core problem in Europe is simply one of 
‘commercialization’ – are all myths. They are myths about where entrepreneurship and innovation come from” 
(Mazzucato, 2014, p. 33). Recently, also Bianchi (2013) has emphasized the importance of Italian state owned 
enterprises in terms of innovation along the past century. 
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Nevertheless, this point deserves closer attention as far as the Italian economy is concerned. 
Broadly speaking, the relation between investment and employment is strongly associated to the 
relation between investment and income. Yet, recent literature has shown that the impact of 
investment on GDP growth has been decreasingly effective in Italy between 1987 and 2012 
(Lucarelli et al., 2013). In short, the lack of an adequate productive specialization in high-tech 
sectors implies that the Italian firms (operating in these branches) have systematically had to 
import capital goods, as evidenced by the continuous sectoral trade deficits. Within this 
framework, the structure of the Italian economy tended to lower the multiplier effect of the 
investment on income, when compared to other European countries. Such a situation can be 
reverted only if Italy directs the accumulation of capital towards a change in its productive 
specialization (ibid., p. 202). 
In the latter part of this article, we are going to analyse in depth the relationship between 
aggregate demand and productive structure in Italy. However, at this stage of the analysis, it is 
already possible to note that, in the Italian economy, the so-called ‘capital productivity’14 (i.e. 
gross domestic product divided by the value of the capital stock), has decreased sharply in the 
first decade of the 2000s, becoming lower than that of other European countries in 2006, i.e. 
already before the global crisis of 2008. Figure 4 highlights such a decreasing trend (despite the 
good performance of the 1990s). This result may implicitly support the thesis that, although 
existing, the impact of the investment on gross domestic product is weaker in Italy than in the 
rest of the European countries because of the lack of productive specialization in high-tech 
branches.15 
                                                             
14 As the Cambridge capital controversy showed, there is an aggregation problem in defining the productivity of 
capital. See, among others, Harcourt (1972), Lebowitz (2009), Nell and Thirlwall (2017). 
15 Nell and Thirwall (2017) analysed the causes of the different productivities of investment across countries. 
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On the other hand, the analysis of private investment in Italy also questions the 
economists’ shared assumptions. Broadly speaking, private investment is traditionally 
assumed to be a function of expected profitability. On the contrary, it seems that in Italy a rising 
real wage-rate boosted capital accumulation. However, one should remember that several 
economists have disputed this traditional understanding. Besides e.g. Adam Smith and J.M. 
Keynes,16 Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy (2014) have recently showed that investments 
and profits are negatively correlated in the United States. In their analysis, a distinctive feature 
of neoliberalism is that firms systematically retain profits in order to allocate them in the 
financial sector. Accordingly, large profit rates do not motivate capitalists and/or enterprises 
in their propensity to invest and do not contribute anymore to the financing of investment. 
From this perspective, Italy seems to manifest the same tendencies. However, rather than 
to the financial sector alone (Tropeano, 2012), a significant part of private profits have been 
                                                             
capital/labor ratio) may even lead to slower growth because in most EU countries the output elasticity with respect 
to labor is higher than the elasticity with respect to capital. Italy will start growing again if its firms start hiring and 
stop thinking in terms of substituting more capital for labor.” 
16 “The high rate of profit seems everywhere to destroy that parsimony which, in other circumstances, is natural to 
the character of the merchant. When profits are high, that sober virtue seems to be superfluous and expensive luxury 
to suit better the affluence of his situation. But the owners of the great mercantile capitals are necessarily the leaders 
and conductors of the whole industry of every nation; and their example has a much greater influence upon the 
manners of the whole industrious part of it than that of any other order of men” (Smith, [1776] 1979, p. 612). “This 
would not mean that the use of capital instruments would cost almost nothing, but only that the return for them 
would have to cover little more than their exhaustion by wastage and obsolescence together with some margin to 
cover risk and the exercise of skill and judgment […]. Now, though this state of affairs would be quite compatible 
with some measure of individualism, yet it would mean the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the 
euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital” (Keynes, 
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displaced abroad. Not only in Italy (also in Germany) outsourcing has been extremely intense 
between 1995 and 2006 (Breda and Chiapparello, 2010), but the dimensions of the 
phenomenon have been actually closer to a massive offshoring. Accordingly, domestic 
investment dropped to an extremely low level, unlike in Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2011; Simonazzi et al., 2013). 
A useful relationship to clarify this issue is the variation of the real wage compared to the 
variation of capital stock. Figure 5 shows that their correlation is positive, or, more precisely, 
both the trend of the rate of variation of real wages and of that of the capital stock have been 
decreasing during the whole period considered. 
 
 








Even if this evidence does not account for any causal relationship, a similar result is 
consistent with the thesis that accumulation of capital (and, therefore, economic growth) has 
been wage-led in Italy. Accordingly, wage deflation has acted as a disincentive to invest, 
inescapably determining a fall in labour productivity (Sylos Labini, 1984b; 1985; 2004; Coltorti 
and Venanzi, 2017). 
Finally, in order to complete our analysis, it is useful to consider the positive correlation 
between public expenditure and employment since 1995 (the first year in the AMECO database 
for the public expenditure data) as shown in fig. 6. 
According to our thesis, it is possible to conclude that fiscal conservatism (particularly, 
compression of public investment) and massive offshoring have negatively affected the level 
of employment in Italy. Consequently, it seems reasonable to suggest that the first step to solve 
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3. The enhanced effect of the crisis on the job market: A consequence of the Italian 
industrial structure 
 
In what follows, we are going to analyse the most significant features of the Italian industrial 
sector, particularly when compared with the rest of the EMU area. The proposed analysis is 
disaggregated in terms of firm size (number of salaried employees) in order to highlight both the 
transformation of the Italian industrial structure in the past three decades and its repercussions 
on the job market after the crisis. Of course, this is only one possible way of analysing such issue, 
since changes in the relationships between firms (clusters, vertical integration, outsourcing, 
global chain value etc.) represent another important aspect of the very same problem. Therefore, 
at the end of this paragraph we are going to briefly discus this related issue. 
 
 
Table 2 – Manufacturing, 2013 
 
 R&D expenditure on 
added value 
R&D expenditure on 
gross investment 
France 8.1% 50.8% 
Germany 9.4% 78.5% 
Italy 4.2% 33.8% 
 
Notes: 2013 is the last available year in the OECD database that allows a comparison between the three countries. 
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Firstly, Research and Development (R&D) expenditure is very low in the Italian productive 
system when compared to that in other European countries. Table 2 shows both the poor 
performance of the Italian manufacture firms (with regard to the relationship between R&D 
expenditure and the added value) and the astonishingly low ratio of R&D expenditure on gross 
investment. This is a serious structural weakness of the Italian productive system, to be 
situated at the origin of the dependency on the imported hi-tech capital goods, described in 
section 3 and in Lucarelli et al. (2013).  
Figures 7a and 7b show the evolution of manufacturing employment since 1981, the year 
in which it reached its peak in Italy: total decrease until 2015 was equivalent to over 1,500,000 
people. This phenomenon is not particularly original, since de-industrialization has been a 
common feature of all the advanced economies during the past thirty-five years. Nevertheless, 
in the Italian case, big enterprises (according to the Eurostat taxonomy17) showed the worst 
performance, as their loss of employment was superior to both the medium and the small 
enterprises. Such evidence reinforces the conclusions of the previous section: offshoring 
played a pivotal role in Italy. Furthermore, the biggest loss of employment within big 
enterprises took place before the crisis (see also table 3 below). 
 
 
Figure 7a – Manufacturing employment, 1971-2011 
 




Note: figure 7a plots data from ISTAT ten-year census; since the last available census data is for year 2011, figure 
7b plots data for the period 2011-2015 available from ISTAT, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses. 
Sources: ISTAT, Ten-year Industry and Services Census, available at http://www.istat.it/it/censimenti-
permanenti/imprese; and Istat, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses, available at 
www.istat.it/it/archivio/107133; www.istat.it/it/archivio/140207; www.istat.it/it/archivio/175950; 




                                                             
17 Following Eurostat, we use the terms: ‘micro enterprises’ (0 to 9 employees); ‘small enterprises’ (10 to 19); 
‘medium-small enterprises’ (20 to 49); ‘medium enterprises’ (50 to 249) and big enterprises (over 249). It is worth 
noting, however, that in the Italian literature ‘medium enterprises’ are actually the ones employing 50 to 499 
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Figure 8 – Distribution of total employment (manufacture) 
 
 




In other words, not only did the Italian manufacture branch contract during the past three 
decades, but it also changed its composition: medium-small sized firms replaced big 
enterprises in terms of total employment. Figure 8 shows this transformation, comparing 1971 
and 2015. Compared to 1971, the importance of big enterprises in terms of total employment 
of the industrial sector has decreased from 39% to 24%; medium enterprises’ participation 
has remained constant, whereas the share of employment generated by medium-small, small 
and micro enterprises has increased (small enterprises have almost doubled their share: from 
8% to 15%). Micro enterprises deserve a further remark: even if employment has increased at 
a slower pace (from 19% to 24%) than in small firms, they currently represent the most 
important class of enterprises by number of employees.18 Among the EMU countries, only in 
Greece and Cyprus micro-enterprises play a more important role.19  
In Italy “technical efficiency has a strong dimensional component […] increasing 
progressively in the biggest class of enterprises” (ISTAT, 2014, p. 54); therefore, such a 
structural change determined a weakening of the whole industrial sector, for several reasons. 
In the first place, the relative importance of small enterprises negatively affected R&D activity 
(Brandolini and Buganelli, 2009). In the second place, a lower productivity of labour, a low 
level of investment and a limited access to information and communication technologies 
(Rossi, 2015; Ciocca, 2003) characterize small enterprises. In the third place, small firms have 
also a very limited internationalization, both active and passive (Cristadoro and Federico, 
2015). 
                                                             
18 De Mitri et al. (2013) remark that in traditional branches (textile, food and wood industries) micro-enterprises 
employ over 30% of total workers.  
19 See e.g. Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, Annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates 
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Figure 9 shows that in Italy the level of investment (both per employee and as a share of 
value added) is directly proportional to the size of the firm: medium and big enterprises are 
characterized by a high level of investment. It will be noted that the micro enterprises show a 
very low level of investment per employee, but a level of investment on added value similar to 
that of medium-small enterprises. However, this is not surprising, because, as it will be shown 
below (table 5), the labour productivity of medium-small enterprises is roughly two times that 
of micro enterprises. 
 
 




Source: ISTAT, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses, available at www.istat.it/it/archivio/206643 
 
 
Table 3 – Variation in employment (manufacture) 
 
 1981-2015 2007-2009 2009-2015 2007-2015 
0-9 –28.42% –11.33% –13.39% –23.21% 
10-19 –21.29% –9.5% –15.07% –23.14% 
20-49 –20.19% –7.72% –15.22% –21.76% 
50-249 –27.44% –2.86% –9.86% –12.43% 
Over 249 –48.53% –0.36% –9.33% –9.66% 
Total –33.04% –6.14% –12.15% –17.55% 
 
Source: ISTAT, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses, available at www.istat.it/it/archivio/206643 
 
 
Accordingly, during the crisis (2007-2015), the contraction of employment (which in turn 
depended on the fall of investment) was higher in the small and micro enterprises than in the 
medium and big ones (table 3). This result is in line with ISTAT Report on Italian Clusters 
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in clusters, in the 2001-2011 period. Conversely, employment in “local systems non-district” 
(i.e. biggest productive unities) increased by +22.8%. 
Export is, of course, a closely related issue. In times of fiscal adjustment and declining 
domestic demand, the external channel represents a crucial resource in order to counteract the 
effect of a recession.20 However, export necessarily implies a high degree of competitiveness. 
Recently, the Report on the Competitiveness of the Productive Sectors (ISTAT, 2017a) has 
emphasized that in 2014, the top 20 Italian exporters represented 13% of the industrial sector, 
which is a smaller portion than the top five French and German exporting firms. In addition, the 
exporting firms in Italy are also characterized by a smaller size: micro enterprises represent 65% 
(and small enterprises 29%) of total exporting firms. As a result, it contends that most of the 
exporting firms are still (largely) dependent on domestic demand since, as shown by figure 10, 
the share of export sales over total sales is related to the size of the enterprises in Italy. 
Not surprisingly, exporting firms have shown a far better performance in terms of profit. In 
2015, the profit share on value added has been very low for micro non-exporting enterprises. 
However, non-exporting micro enterprises still represent the vast majority within each branch. 
 
 




Source: ISTAT, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses, available at www.istat.it/it/archivio/206643 
 
 
Finally, it is important to stress that several works have shown that our results hold true 
also in terms of global value chain analysis. Broadly speaking, big and medium enterprises act 
as leaders of the value chain, focusing on the high value-added activities. In turn, small 
enterprises play a subordinated and complementary role, which becomes extremely risky in 
the event of a crisis. From this perspective, the prevalence of small firms in Italy has also 
implied their intermediate position in the global value chains, characterized by a low 
                                                             
20 Simonazzi et al. (2013) emphasize that Italian clusters’ capability of finding new markets have been modest, when 
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productivity. Accordingly, the 2008 crisis had severe consequences on Italian firms (Sacchetti 
and Sugden, 2003; Razzolini and Vannoni, 2007; Accetturo et al., 2011; Giunta et al., 2012; 








Source: ISTAT, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses, available at www.istat.it/it/archivio/206643 
 
 
The declining productivity of labour 
 
The analysis developed in the previous section implies that, in the first place, productivity 
of labour was negatively affected by fiscal adjustment and outsourcing/offshoring. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggest that the loss in productivity caused by outsourcing 
and offshoring was not even counterbalanced by a corresponding influx of investment income. 
The balance of investment income, direct investment and reinvested Earnings on FDI for the 
total economy shows a deficit between 1995 and 1998; a moderate surplus in 1999; a deficit 
in the 2000-2003 period; a surplus in 2004-2014 and, finally, a deficit in 2015 and 2016.21 In 
addition, even the surpluses in investment income were unable to affect the balance of neither 
primary income nor current account during the analysed years (Cecioni and Ferrero, 2012). 
However, it should also be considered that the most critical feature of the Italian industrial 
sector is the relative importance of small and micro enterprises, characterized by both low 
productivity of labour and extremely low internationalization. Table 4 compares the share of 
employees with the share of value added for the different classes of enterprise: such a 
comparison is a preliminary way of measuring labour productivity.  
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(on total) (on total) 
0-9 11.55% 24.13% 
10-19 11.42% 14.5% 
20-49 15.28% 15.6% 
50-249 27.85% 22.26% 
Over 249 33.91% 23.52% 
 
Source: ISTAT, Structure and Competitiveness of Businesses, available at www.istat.it/it/archivio/206643 
 
 
Both micro and small enterprises show a share of employees higher than the share of value 
added (i.e. labour productivity is lower than the average of the industrial sector). Medium-
small enterprises are characterized by an equal share of employees and valued added (i.e. 
labour productivity is equal to the average of the industrial sector). Finally, medium and big 
enterprises’ labour productivity is higher than the average of the industrial sector. In other 
words, the much debated problem of Italian labour productivity is (also) a problem of small 
sized enterprises. A comparison with Germany and France shows that it is true that labour 
productivity is lower in Italy. However, by disaggregating each industrial sector we 
immediately notice that Italy’s performance is negatively affected (mainly) by micro 
enterprises and (partly) by big firms. On the contrary, Italian labour productivity is higher than 
Germany’s in any other class of firms, and even to France’s medium enterprises. Table 5 shows 
such a result, considering the apparent labour productivity in 2015.22 
 
 
Table 5 – Apparent labour productivity (manufacture, 2015) 
 
 Total 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 over 249 
Germany 73.6 35.2 42.7 50.3 59.6 91.7 
France 71.7 46.3 52 57.6 63 88.6 
Italy 58.8 28.2 46.3 57.6 73.6 84.8 
 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics. Annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of 
activities (NACE Rev. 2), available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database  
 
 
Extending such analysis to the 1999-2015 period (table 6), we obtain some very 
interesting results: as far as the medium-small, medium and big enterprises are concerned, the 
increase in apparent labour productivity has been constantly higher in Italy than in Germany 
and France, even during the 2007-2015 period (that corresponded to Italy’s most severe 
recession). The only exception is represented by micro enterprises. Table 7 focuses on this 
aspect of the problem: the anomalous importance of micro enterprises in Italy (in terms of 
employees), when compared to the EU average, France and Germany. 
 
                                                             
22 Apparent labour productivity is defined as value added at factor costs divided by the number of persons 
employed. 
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Table 6 – Apparent labour productivity (manufacture, nominal annual rate of growth) 
 
 1999-2007 2007-2015 1999-2015 
Total Manufacture 
Germany 3.32% 1.2% 2.26% 
France 2.58% 1.87% 2.23% 
Italy 3.33% 1.87% 2.6% 
0-9 
Germany 4.63% 0.47% 2.53% 
France 3.01% 0.78% 1.89% 
Italy 2.34% 0.18% 1.25% 
10-19 
Germany 2.43% 0.27% 1.34% 
France 2.55% 1.68% 2.12% 
Italy 4.22% 1.05% 2.62% 
20-49 
Germany 1.49% 0.96% 1.22% 
France 3.1% 1.26% 2.18% 
Italy 3.33% 1.91% 2.62% 
50-249 
Germany 2.74% 0.45% 1.59% 
France 2.9% 1.64% 2.27% 
Italy 3.13% 2.15% 2.64% 
Over 249 
Germany 3.74% 1.38% 2.55% 
France 2.3% 2.16% 2.23% 
Italy 3.67% 1.96% 2.81% 
 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of 
activities (NACE Rev. 2); manufacturing, subsections DA-DE and total (NACE Rev. 1.1, D) by employment 
size class (1995-2001); manufacturing, subsections DA-DE and total (NACE Rev. 1.1, D) by employment size 




Table 7 – Share of employees on total (manufacture, 2015) 
 
 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 over 249 
European Union 13,3% 7,9% 11,67% 25,66% 41,69% 
Germany 6,74% 7,02% 7,59% 24,21% 54,44% 
France 12,51% 6,62% 11,29% 22,3% 47,28% 
Italy 24,13% 14,5% 15,6% 22,26% 23,52% 
 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of 
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It does not seem plausible to claim that the Italian low productivity of labour depends on 
an (allegedly) higher cost of labour. In table 8, we compare the wage adjusted23 labour 
productivity (i.e. the increase in terms of value added for any euro spent for employees) with 
that of France and Germany, observing very similar results. Even though the Italian 
performance is negatively affected by the micro enterprises (which is not surprising), Italy’s 
data are definitely better than those of Germany and France, particularly in the medium-small, 
medium and big enterprises. 
Not coincidentally, also the comparison between the share of personnel costs in 
production and the share of personnel costs in total purchases of goods and services confirms 
that Italy’s performance is better than that of both Germany and France (tables 9 and 10). 
 
 
Table 8 – Wage adjusted labour productivity (manufacture, 2015) 
 
 Total 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 over 249 
Germany 133.6 142.4 141.3 132.4 134 134 
France 130.2 92.2 122.6 129.3 131.1 131.1 
Italy 138.8 105.9 139 146.4 158.2 158.2 
 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of 
activities (NACE Rev. 2), available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database  
 
 
Table 9 – Share of personnel costs in production (manufacture, 2015) 
 
 Total 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 over 249 
Germany 21.6% 22% 31% 26.5% 23.2% 20.6% 
France 19.9% 28.2% 27.1% 21.9% 20.2% 18.2% 
Italy 15.3% 15.3% 18.2% 17.1% 15.4% 13.9% 
 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of 
activities (NACE Rev. 2), available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database  
 
 
Table 10 – Share of personnel costs in total purchases of goods and services (manufacture, 
2015) 
 
 Total 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 over 249 
Germany 26.4% 36.7% 55.5% 39% 31.8% 23.8% 
France 24% 38.8% 37.5% 28% 25.6% 21.1% 
Italy 19.6% 21.6% 25.2% 22.8% 19.8% 16.6% 
 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics, annual enterprise statistics by size class for special aggregates of 




                                                             
23 The wage adjusted labour productivity is defined as value added divided by personnel costs, which is 
subsequently adjusted by the share of paid employees in the total number of persons employed or, to put it simply, 
apparent labour productivity divided by the average personnel costs. 
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Table 10 needs a further qualification: the outsourcing of the Italian firms contributes to 
the extremely low level of the Italian share of personnel costs in total purchases of goods and 
services too. It has been noticed (Breda and Chiapparello, 2010) that in the manufacturing 
sector, “Italian firms seem to be even more internationalized than German firms: in 2006 the 
import content of production amounted to 30.4 per cent in Italy and to 28.2 per cent in 
Germany, despite the higher share of low-tech sectors, which are the least internationally 
fragmented, in the first country” (ibid., p. 7).  
The differential in the import content of production (+2.2%) does not affect the validity of 
our conclusions: costs of labour have nothing to do with the problems of competitiveness 
evidenced by the Italian economy. The enhanced effects of the global crisis on the Italian job 
market do not depend on the excessive costs of labour and/or on its insufficient flexibility. 
Quite on the contrary, they are the consequence of the (regressive) structural change of the 
Italian industrial sector that took place in the past three decades, which determined an 
unbalanced distribution of industrial employees towards non-competitive micro-enterprises.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis developed in this article led us to a different interpretation of the jobs crisis 
in Italy than is usually put forward. Unlike most popular views on this issue, which focus on the 
rigidity of the job market and/or the deficiencies of regulation, we argued that the crisis in the 
labour market is the consequence of two main determinants. 
In the first place, empirical evidence suggests that fiscal conservatism (before the crisis) 
and fiscal adjustment (after the crisis) have led to a constant fall in investment, both public and 
private, which became dramatic during the 2008-2012 period. Such a tendency, further 
reinforced by the intensity of both offshoring and outsourcing, inevitably affected both GDP 
and employment.  
In the second place, by means of a disaggregated analysis(in terms of employees) of the 
Italian industrial sector, we have shown the imbalanced distribution of employees, skewed 
towards non-competitive micro and small enterprises. Accordingly, the loss of employment 
determined by the global crisis was stronger in Italy than in other European countries (France, 
Germany) because of a regressive change in its productive structure, which took place in the 
past four decades.   
Stated succinctly, austerity and the lack of industrial policy have conditioned a deep crisis 
that involved both the quantity and the quality of jobs in Italy. Furthermore, several indicators 
(e.g. the rate of inactive population; long-term unemployment and discouraged workers) 
suggest that the problems of the Italian job market have already turned into structural 
deficiencies. Therefore, even an expansionary fiscal policy (which does not seem plausible, 
under the present circumstances) would be insufficient in order to counteract the Italian jobs 
crisis. 
Rather than insisting with the same strategy (i.e. deregulating the job market), policy 
makers should act resolutely, keeping in mind Albert Einstein’s lesson: “insanity is doing the 
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